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Abstract
This paper considers the eﬃciency properties of risk-neutral workers’ mobility deci-
sions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, when
the rent accruing to a match is split through bargaining. Matches are ex ante homoge-
neous and their true productivity is learnt after the match is formed. It is shown that
the eﬃciency of worker turnover depends on contract enforceability, and that in the
absence of complete enforceability the equilibrium fails to be eﬃcient. This is because
without complete enforceability firms cannot credibly oﬀer workers contracts that will
guarantee them the entire future of all potential future matches.
Keywords: On-the-Job Search; Learning; Bargaining; Contracts; Enforceability.
JEL codes: J30; J63.
1 Introduction
The existence and the nature of worker turnover1 has been studied by at least two separate
strands of the economic literature. The first focuses on the fact that it is time consuming
for workers (firms) to learn about employment opportunities (workers) available, i.e., there
are search frictions, to explain that a worker who has just lost her job will typically go
∗I am grateful to Ken Burdett, Jan Eeckhout, Guillaume Rocheteau, Serene Tan and Randy Wright
for their comments. I also would like to thank the participants of the NUS Macro Brownbag seminar
and of the 2006 Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society. The usual disclaimer applies. Email:
njacquet@smu.edu.sg. Address: 90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903.
1Empirical studies often define worker turnover as follows: worker turnover for a given period at a given
establishment is the sum of the number of accessions and separations from the beginning to the end of the
period. And aggregate worker turnover is the sum of worker turnover over all establishments.
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through an unemployment spell. And once a worker finds a job, this new match will
eventually get destroyed, typically because either some productivity shock renders the match
no longer productive or the worker has found another match. The Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides model (DMP) (see Diamond, 1982; Pissarides, 1984; Mortensen and Pissarides,
1994) and the Burdett-Mortensen (1998) model are the canonical models of this branch of
the literature. Another strand of the literature, following Jovanovic (1979), focuses on the
information frictions that limit the ex ante knowledge that a firm and a worker have about
the quality of the match and on the fact that more information is learnt as the tenure of
the worker on the job increases. In this case jobs are said to be experience goods.
The existence of search frictions means that when matches are ex ante heterogeneous,
workers and firms do not wait for the perfect match to come along. Instead, a firm and
a worker will agree to match if its value is acceptable to both of them, which requires the
value of the match to each party to be above their own reservation values. However, because
firms and workers do not always enter into the best possible match, there is an incentive
for them to search for another better match, although it is standard to assume that only
workers search while employed.2 In this case, a job-to-job mobility decision is driven solely
by the arrival of information about a new, more profitable match.
When jobs are experience goods, there is another source of worker turnover: since
information about a match is discovered over time, the mobility decision is also motivated
by what is being learnt about the quality of the current match. If the worker and the firm
believe that the match they are in is of low quality, they might decide to severe the match,
in which case, absent search frictions, the worker changes job and the firm hires a new
worker.
The learning literature generally abstracts from search frictions, which ensures that
workers get paid their expected marginal productivity and that their job mobility decisions
are eﬃcient (see Jovanovic, 1979, and Felli and Harris, 1996).3
On the contrary, random search models are often ineﬃcient. In the search and matching
models of the DMP vein the ineﬃciency is generic and arises because of search externalities
(Mortensen, 1978, 1982; Diamond, 1982; Pissarides, 1984). For instance, when a worker
2Mortensen (1978, 1982), Diamond and Maskin (1979) and Kiyotaki and Lagos (2007) are notable ex-
ceptions.
3Jovanovic (1984) extends his previous (1979) paper by introducing search frictions, but he maintains
the assumption that workers get paid their expected marginal productivity.
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searches for a job she neither takes into account the negative externality she imposes on
the other workers searching, nor the positive externality she creates for firms seeking to
fill vacant jobs. Unless the bargaining powers of workers and firms satisfy the Hosios
condition,4 the two externalities will not oﬀset each other, implying that agents are searching
ineﬃciently. Random search models where employment contracts, which in general are
simple wage contracts, are posted rather than bargained do not suﬀer from such search
externalities because contact rates are constant. However, although the original Burdett-
Mortensen (1998) model with heterogeneous firms is eﬃcient because more productive firms
post higher wages, Stevens (2004) shows that when firms post employment contracts rather
than wage contracts, the equilibrium need not be eﬃcient. This is because with employment
contracts firms can design contracts that ensures that separations between workers and firms
are eﬃcient, but the anonymity of contracts posted preclude firms from making sure that
their recruitment policies are eﬃcient.
This paper is part of the, still small, literature that aims at bringing together the search
and learning literatures. More specifically, this paper is interested in the eﬃciency proper-
ties of the mobility decision of risk-neutral workers in an equilibrium with search frictions,
but no search externalities, and when the rent accruing to a match is split through bargain-
ing. The model is a variant of the Burdett-Mortensen framework where firms are endowed
with a constant returns to labor production function. However, matches are here ex ante
homogeneous, the quality of a match is learnt after the match is formed and employment
contracts are not posted but negotiated before a match is formed. Firms and workers
bargain over contingent contracts, which can include side-payments like sign-on fees or sev-
erance payments. Renegotiations are allowed, but both parties must agree to renegotiate
for an employment contract to be modified. In the benchmark model it is further assumed
that, although contracts are binding during an employment relationship since the terms of
a contract these changes must be approved by both the worker and the firm, the enforce-
ability of a contract is limited because either party can walk away from the match at no
cost.
In this environment with limited enforceability, there is a maximum expected value of a
match that new employers can credibly oﬀer to a worker, and this maximum expected value
depends on the maximum value that the employer can pledge for each possible realization
4See Hosios (1990).
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of the quality of the match. This implies that there is a maximum productivity of a match
for a currently employed worker beyond which she will no longer decide to change job. It
is shown that with limited enforceability of employment contracts, the mobility decision of
workers is ineﬃcient, in that the highest productivity of a match for which workers will stop
accepting a new job is lower than the eﬃcient productivity cut-oﬀ, for as long as workers
do not capture the entire surplus of a match.
The reason for the ineﬃciency lies, like for models of investments that are subject to hold-
up problems (Grout, 1984; Acemoglu, 1997; Masters, 1998; Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999,
Malcomson, 1999), in the incompleteness of contracts: an agent, in this case a worker,
cannot contract with another agent she has not met yet, in this case a future employer.
However, there is no investment in the present paper, and hence the eﬃciency uncovered
is novel. Consider a worker who is deciding whether to change job and who is indiﬀerent
between the two contracts oﬀered to her which are such that both her current employer and
the poaching firm oﬀer her the entire (expected) surplus of the respective matches. There
is a possibility that this new match will be of a low quality, and in this case the worker
will wish to find another job with another employer. If the worker could have contracted
with that future employer at the moment of her first job change, she would have been
able to obtain the entire expected surplus of the match from this firm as well. However,
because the worker does not know which firm she will be in contact with in the future, she
cannot contract with future employers, and the share of the surplus of her future jobs will
be determined by the productivity of her new job. But if the productivity in her new job
turns out to be low, she will obtain only a fraction of the surplus of the next match.
It turns out that the incompleteness of contract responsible for the ineﬃciency can be
circumvented if there is full enforceability of contracts in that firms cannot walk away from a
contract. This is because in this case a new employer can design a contract that guarantees
to the worker it is trying to poach away that she will be able to capture the entire surplus of
all future matches she will be a part of. These types of contracts require full enforceability
because the value of a match to the firm is negative for a positive measure of values of the
productivity draw, implying that for these productivity levels the firm would like to either
renegotiate or walk away from the contract.
It has been established by a number of studies that job-to-job flows are large,5 and the
5For instance, for the US job-to-job transitions are roughly twice as large as flows from unemployment
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results of Nagypál (2007) indicate that learning is economically significant. Furthermore,
Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2005) estimate, using a French administrative data set and
a variant of the Burdett-Mortensen model where wages are determined by bargaining, that
the bargaining powers of the all but one group of workers are no greater than 40 per cent and
can be as low as 0 per cent for the lowest-skilled groups. Although Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and
Robin’s model abstract from learning, these results suggest that the welfare consequences
of employment contracts enforceability are potentially important.
In addition to the vast separate literatures on search and on learning mentioned earlier,
this paper is related to papers by Jovanovic (1984), Moscarini (2005) and Nagypál (2007)
who also consider search models where match quality is learnt over time. However, none of
these papers is concerned about eﬃciency of the mobility decisions.
Papers by Burdett and Coles (2003), Stevens (2004) and Dey and Flinn (2005) are
also related because they consider more general labor contracts than standard fixed-wage
contracts. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a,b) and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2005)
are also variants of the Burdett-Mortensen model that are interested in match turnover
where firms and worker can renegotiate contracts when a worker is contacted by another
firm. However, they consider environments where there is no uncertainty about a match
quality, and eﬃciency is trivially obtained.
The models of Mortensen (1978, 1982), Diamond and Maskin (1979) and Kiyotaki and
Lagos (2007) study match turnover where both partners to a match can search for another
match, whereas in this paper firms do not seek to replace an employed worker.6 The first
two papers show that when an agent is forced to compensate the other(s) party(ies) to the
match for her (their) loss(es) when the match is severed, eﬃciency is obtained. In Kiyotaki
and Lagos’ model, equilibrium mobility decisions are ineﬃcient, but the ineﬃciency is due
to search externalities arising from the quadratic matching function they assume.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and the eﬃcient mobility
decision is characterized in section 3. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium mobility
decision in the benchmark model with limited enforceability of contracts. Section 5 then
analyzes the source of the ineﬃciency. Section 6 shows that eﬃciency can be restored if
contracts are fully enforceable and discusses the eﬃciency result. Section 7 concludes.
to employment. See Moscarini (2003) for more details.
6Firms’ production technology displays constant returns to labor and therefore firms are happy to employ
all workers whose value is positive to them.
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2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
Time is continuous and the horizon is infinite. There is a unit mass of profit-maximizing
firms, all of which are endowed with a constant returns to labor production function. The
linearity of the technology implies the value of a worker to a firm is independent of the
measure, and productivity, of all other workers employed by the firm.
There is a measure n < 1 of infinitely-lived workers who discount the future at rate r > 0
and maximize the discounted sum of expected flow utility. All workers are ex ante identical,
and the flow utility of being unemployed is b while the flow utility of being employed at
wage w is u(w) = w.
It is assumed that workers, both employed and unemployed, can search costlessly and
that search is random. Workers7 meet firms according to a Poisson process with exogenous
parameter α > 0. When a worker meets a firm, the productivity the worker will have in that
match is ex ante unknown. If they agree to form a match, they then draw a productivity x
from a known cdf F which has X = [x, x] for support, with x > b.8 It is further assumed
that the productivity draw is observed perfectly by the worker and the firm upon formation
of a match. Matches between a firm and a worker are exogenously destroyed at an exogenous
exponential rate δ. Moreover, when an employed worker meets another firm and decides to
leave her current employer for the new employer, one job is destroyed in order to create
another job.
In order to close the model we need to lay out the rules pertaining to the determination
of a contract governing the relationship between a firm and an employee. First, it is assumed
that all contracts are the outcome of a bargaining game between the worker and one or two
firms,9 and bargaining takes place before the productivity of a new match is known. I
7 In equilibrium all workers but those employed in jobs with the maximum productivity have a gain from
search. Hence, the full measure of workers will be searching in equilibrium.
8This is a simplifying assumption. In fact, one could have more generally assumed that x < b, but the
derivations of the results are then more involved without aﬀecting the results on eﬃciency.
9Because the probability of meeting two firms at the same time is zero, an unemployed worker will almost
surely negotiate with only one firm at a time. I therefore ignore the possibility of a tripartite bargaining
involving an unemployed worker. However, employed workers will be in contact with other firms, in which
case the bargaining will involve three parties, ignoring once again measure zero events where a worker is
contacted by two or more new firms at the same time.
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will be considering an environment where both firms and workers can commit to long-term
contracts, and where they can modify the terms of contract governing their relationship if
and only if both agree to the modifications. In the benchmark case, however, there is limited
enforceability of contracts as it is assumed that both workers and firms can walk away from
a contract at no cost. This implies that if a party to the match refuses to renegotiate a
contract the other part has two options, either to honor the current contract or to severe
the match. This assumption regarding the extent to which workers and firms can commit
to a contract will be modified in Section 5 to allow for complete enforceability.
There are two types of contacts between a worker and a new potential employer, since
the worker can be either unemployed or employed at that time. There are therefore two
types of games to be considered: a bargaining game between a firm and an unemployed
worker (Game 1) and a bargaining game between an employed worker, her current employer
and a newly contacted firm (Game 2). In either case the game has two stages, and it is
assumed that bargaining takes place in artificial time so that there is no delay between the
time a contact is made and the time the outcome of the relevant bargaining game is reached.
For Game 1 the bargaining game follows the ensuing protocol.
Game 1:
1. In the first stage the firm proposes a contract to the worker; the worker either accepts,
in which case bargaining is over, or she turns it down, in which case the bargaining
process reaches the second round.
2. In the second stage the worker gets to propose a contract with probability β ∈ (0, 1)
and the firm gets to propose with probability 1−β. If both parties agree on the contract
proposed, the match is formed. Otherwise bargaining stops and no match is formed.
If a worker and a firm currently matched wish to renegotiate their contract, the renego-
tiation takes place following the rules of Game 1.
The rules of Game 2 are the following.
Game 2:
1. In the first stage both firms simultaneously propose a contract to the worker; the worker
either accepts an oﬀer and signs a new contract or keeps her existing contract.
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2. In the second, and final, stage the worker gets to propose a contract to each firm with
probability β ∈ (0, 1) and the firms with probability 1− β the firms enter a Bertrand
competition for the worker.10 If the worker and one firm agree on the contract pro-
posed, they match. If agreement is reached for both contracts, then the worker picks
her preferred contract. Otherwise the worker keeps her previous contract.
As mentioned earlier, bargaining takes place before the productivity of the worker in a
new match is known. Hence, if bargaining is restricted to be over a constant wage, or to be
independent of what the actual productivity of the match will be, ineﬃciencies can arise that
originate solely from the restriction on the set of contracts allowed rather than from their
enforceability. I thus allow contracts to be contingent on the productivity of the worker, to
be tenure-dependent and to include side-payments. However, in the benchmark case some
types of side-payments cannot exist in equilibrium: bonuses paid upon termination of a
match or penalties for breach of a contract will not exist since both firms and workers can
terminate a match and walk away from a contract if they wish to do so. Moreover, for this
benchmark case with limited contract enforceability, I will be focusing on contracts that are
renegotiation-proof in that neither the firm nor the worker have an incentive to walk away
from a match.
At this point a few remarks are in order. The set-up has been chosen so as to focus on
the source of the mobility ineﬃciency, and a number of modelling choices and simplifying
assumptions can be relaxed without aﬀecting qualitatively the results obtained.
The linear production technology is reminiscent of the one used by Burdett and Mortensen
(1998), and it enables me to assume away externalities. It should also be mentioned that it
would be possible to adopt the DMP matching framework and obtain the same ineﬃciency.
But because the matching framework is inherently ineﬃcient due to search externalities, the
framework adopted here makes it clear that the source of the ineﬃciently is contractual,
and not due to search externalities.
Similarly, it has been assumed that workers’ search eﬃciency does not depend on their
employment status. It would be possible to introduce diﬀerentiated arrival rates of meetings
for unemployed and employed without changing the main result.
10The result would be unchanged if the stochastic processes giving the right to make an oﬀer were uncor-
related for the two firms.
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The form of productivity uncertainty adopted in this paper resembles that of the stochas-
tic job matching model of Pissarides (1984). There is one important diﬀerence compared
with Pissarides. In his original model the value of the draw is known before the match
is formed. However, Pissarides does not allow for on-the-job search and contracts are re-
stricted to be wage contracts, and therefore, assuming that the draw is done before or after
the match is formed is innocuous. In the present paper, it is crucial to assume that a
worker needs to form a match with a firm in order to be able to learn about her actual
productivity in that firm. This captures the idea, in the spirit of Jovanovic (1979, 1984),
that jobs are experience goods and therefore that new jobs are uncertain. This uncertainty
is both absolute, because the uncertainty reduces with tenure; and relative, since more is
known about a job in which one has experience than about a new job.
The learning process in this paper is purposely kept as simple as possible by assuming
that the productivity is learnt right after a match is formed.11 The results I obtain would
be left unchanged if instead it were assumed that learning was progressive, but it would
complicate the algebra. Furthermore, the results of Pries (2004) indicate that match sev-
erance tends to happen early in the tenure of the worker. In fact, he finds that for the US,
80 per cent of match separations happen within the first two years of a match.
There are typically two ways to approach bargaining in search models: using the Nash
solution or choosing a specific strategic bargaining game. With on-the-job search there
are at least two reasons why the second solution is more appropriate and will therefore be
adopted in this paper. First, when an employed worker encounters another firm, he has two
potential employers to bargain with. If Nash bargaining were to be used, it would not be
clear in such situations what would be the outside options and threat points of the worker
and of each of the two firms, and any specific choice might seem arbitrary. Having recourse
to a strategic bargaining approach, although the specific game chosen can itself be deemed
arbitrary, makes it easier to identify the source of the ineﬃciency in the mobility decision
of the worker, should there be any. Moreover, and perhaps more fundamentally, as Shimer
(2006) has shown, the conditions of applicability of the Nash bargaining solution can be
11Wright (1986) makes the same assumption. It would be easy to extend the analysis to introduce a signal
of match quality before the decision to match is made. There then would exist a threshold for the signal
for each productivity: workers employed in a job with productivity x would change jobs only if the signal
obtained is above some value p (x), with p(x) being increasing in x. See Pries and Rogerson (2005) for a
model with such signals.
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violated when on-the-job search is allowed.
The bargaining games 1 and 2 are similar to the bargaining games adopted by Cahuc,
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2005). The game played between an unemployed worker and a
firm in their case is of the Rubinstein (1982) alternating-oﬀers type, but the outcomes of
their game and mine are identical, and correspond to the Nash solution when workers have
a bargaining power of β. Game 2 aims at capturing the fact that when an employed worker
is contacted by another firm, her situation improves because she can take advantage of the
competition between the two firms.12
3 The Eﬃcient Mobility Decision
In this section I present the constrained socially eﬃcient allocation of workers across jobs,
where the criterion used for eﬃciency is the maximization of steady-state output, augmented
by the value of leisure for unemployed workers. That is, the eﬃcient allocation is that of a
social planner who maximizes
(1− u)
Z
x∈X
xdG(x) + ub,
subject to
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
¦
u = δ(1− u)− αu, and
¦
G(x) = α
h
u
1−u +
R
z∈X σzdG(z)
i
F (x)
−
h
δG(x) + α
R x
x σzdG(z)
i
,
where u is the measure of unemployed worker; G is the cumulative distribution function
of matched workers’ productivities; and σz is an indicator function which is equal to 1 if
a worker employed in a job with productivity z changes employer when a new firm comes
along, and zero otherwise.
Steady-state output, augmented with leisure of unemployed workers, is maximized if and
only if the decisions regarding the formation of matches are eﬃcient. There are only two
decisions in the model, whether a match that has just been formed and whose productivity
has been revealed should be continued; and whether a match between a firm and a worker
contacted by another firm should be severed so that the worker can join the new firm.
12Moscarini (2005) abstracts from this competition eﬀect on the share of the surplus a worker obtains
when in contact with two firms. However, the results of Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin suggest that this
competition eﬀect is important, and that it can be responsible for between 40 to 100 per cent of wage increase
for some groups of workers.
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Since it is assumed that x > b, that there is no cost of search, and there is no diﬀerence
in the eﬃciency of search while employed and unemployed, we have, trivially, that it is
always eﬃcient for a worker who does not have any other option than unemployment to be
matched. Hence, the allocation of workers across firms is eﬃcient if and only if the mobility
decision between jobs is eﬃcient. And it is eﬃcient if and only if the expected value of the
new match is greater than the value of the current match.
Formally, an unemployed worker enjoys a flow value b and he encounters a firm at rate
α. The expected capital gains arising from the formation of a new match are ωe−ωu, where
ωe =
R
x∈X ωxdF (x) is the expected value of a match and ωu is the value of an unemployed
worker. Hence, we have that ωu is such that
rωu = b+ α (ωe − ωu) . (1)
When a worker is working in a job with productivity x and the match is destroyed, ωx
is lost. If the match destruction is exogenous, the worker becomes unemployed and the
capital loss is ωx − ωu. If however the match has been destroyed because the worker leaves
for another firm, the expected capital gain is then ωe − ωx. Hence, we have that the value
of a match with productivity x solves
rωx = x+ ασx (ωe − ωx)− δ (ωx − ωu) . (2)
It is clear that the capital gains from a job mobility decision are positive if and only if
ωe ≥ ωx. It follows that the eﬃcient mobility decision is given by a reservation strategy
with cut-oﬀ ex∗ and the mobility decision follows
σx =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 , for x < ex∗;
[0, 1] , for x = ex∗;
0 , for x > ex∗,
This is intuitive. If a worker is currently employed in a low productivity match, say x = x+
for  small, then the probability with which the worker would draw a higher productivity
when changing jobs is 1 − G(x) which is very close to 1 for a small enough . Therefore,
the risk of drawing a lower productivity than her current one is small, and the expected
gains from changing employer will be positive. If, on the contrary, the worker is currently
employed in a match with a high productivity, say x = x− , then it is highly likely she will
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be less productive in a new job. Therefore, the expected gains from changing jobs will be
negative.
Equation (2) yields that the value of a match with productivity x is
ωx =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x+δωu+αωe
r+δ+α , if x < ex∗, and
x+δωu
r+δ , otherwise.
When a worker is in a job whose productivity x is below the mobility cutoﬀ, the match is
destroyed at rate α+ δ: New jobs arrive at rate α, in which case the expected new value of
employment becomes ωe; and jobs are exogenously destroyed at rate δ, in which case the
new value for the worker is the value of unemployment ωu. Hence, the expected discounted
value of a match with productivity x < ex∗ is given by (x+ δωu + αωe) / (r + δ + α). When
the mobility cutoﬀ is lower than that of the productivity of the match, the match is still
severed exogenously at rate δ, but there is no longer any endogenous job destruction. Hence,
the value of such a match is (x+ δωu) / (r + δ).
Solving for ωe yields
ωe =
δωu
r + δ
+∆(ex∗;α),
where
∆(ex∗;α) ≡ 1
r + δ + α (1− F (ex∗))
∙
xe +
α
r + δ
Z x
hx∗
xdF (x)
¸
.
Hence we obtain that
ωx =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x+∆(hx∗;α)
r+δ+α +
δωu
r+δ , if x < ex∗, and
x
r+δ +
δωu
r+δ , otherwise.
Since the eﬃcient mobility cut-oﬀ is such that ωhx∗ = ωe we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The eﬃcient mobility cut-oﬀ ex∗ is such that
ex∗ = xe + α
r + δ
Z x
hx∗
(x− ex∗) dF (x), (4)
and it is unique.
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Proof. In the Appendix.
It is worth noting for further reference that ex∗ > xe. The intuition behind this result
is the following. Assume workers are restricted to only one job change in between unem-
ployment spells. The value of the current job is such that rωx = x− δ(ωx − ωu), whereas
the expected value of the new job is ωe =
R x
x ωxdF (x), where rωx = x− δ(ωx − ωu) for all
possible values x of the draw. We therefore have that in this case ex∗ = xe. Now allow for
more than one job changes in between unemployment spells. If a worker currently employed
in a job with productivity x who changes job draws a low level of productivity for her new
job, although this decreases the aggregate production level, she will be allowed to search
for another job, and therefore she will then have the possibility of having a good draw. For-
mally, if the worker does not change jobs the expected value of the match is still such that
rωx = x−δ(ωx−ωu), whereas if she takes the risk of changing jobs the expected discounted
value of the new job is ωe =
R x
x ωzdF (z), where now rωz = x+α(ω
e−ωz)− δ(ωz −ωu) for
z ≤ ex∗ and rωz = x−δ(ωz−ωu) otherwise. Hence, the possibility of looking for another job
if a productivity draw is unsatisfactory makes a new job more attractive than if on-the-job
search is ruled out, explaining that the social planner demands workers to change jobs even
for some job productivities that are above the expected productivity from a draw.
4 Equilibrium with Limited Enforceability of Contracts
4.1 Value Functions
By standard arguments, U , the value of search to an unemployed worker solves
rU = b+ α (W e (b)− U) , (5)
where W e (b), the expected value of employment for an unemployed worker, is such that
W e (b) =
Z
x∈X
W 0x (Cx (b)) dF (x).
Cx (b) denotes the contract that will be implemented if the productivity drawn is x when
C (b) = (Cx (b))x∈X is the menu of contingent contracts that has been negotiated between
the firm and the unemployed worker. The initial value of the match to the worker at tenure
0 for productivity x according to C (b) is W 0x (Cx (b)). Although, as will be shown further
below, there might be more than one menu of contracts solving Game 1, all equilibrium
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menus of contracts negotiated between a firm and an unemployed worker must yield the
same expected value of a match W e (b) to the worker.
When a worker employed by a firm i meets another firm j, she must decide whether to
quit her current job. This decision will depend on the value of the match she can obtain
from her current employer i and from firm j during the negotiations taking place according
to the protocol laid out in Game 2. In general, the contracts available to the worker as
outcomes of Game 2 can depend on C, the previous contract between the worker and her
current employer, on the tenure t under this contract, as well as on the productivity of her
current match x. Let C(x,C, t) = (Cz (x,C, t))z∈X denote a menu of contracts available to
the worker if she decides to join firm j, and let eCx (x,C, t) denote a contract available from
her current employer. As in the case of negotiations between an unemployed worker and
a firm, there can be more than one contract, or menu of contracts, that are outcomes of
Game 2 for a given triple (x,C, t). However, all the possible contracting outcomes of Game
2 must yield the same values of employment, W 0x ( eCx (x,C, t)) and W e (x,C, t), of staying
with a firm when the job productivity is x and of joining a new employer respectively.
Naturally a worker changes employers if the contract oﬀered by this new firm yields a
higher value to the worker than what her current employer can propose, i.e., ifW e (x,C, t) ≥
W 0x ( eCx (x,C, t)). Hence, when a worker is employed in a job with productivity x and with
tenure t under a contract C, W tx (C), the value function for the worker is such that for all
t ≥ 0,
rW tx (C) = w
t (C) + α
¡
1− γtx (C)
¢ ³
W 0x
³ eCx (x,C, t)´−W tx (C)´ (6)
+αγtx (C)
¡
W e (x,C, t)−W tx (C)
¢
− δ
¡
W tx (C)− U
¢
+
¦
W tx (C) .
The wage the worker receives under the contract C after tenure t on the job is wt (C), and
¦
W tx (C) is the time derivative of the value function Wx (C). The mobility decision of the
worker is given by the indicator function γtx (C): it is equal to 0 if the worker stays in her
current job under a possibly improved contract, and it is 1 otherwise. It is assumed, without
loss of generality, that when a worker is indiﬀerent between the contracts oﬀered by her
current employer and a another firm, she chooses to change employer. Note that, given that
the wage is allowed to be tenure-dependent, it includes all payments made. For instance,
if a contract signed by the worker with her new employer includes a sign-on bonus φ and
prescribes a flat wage afterwards, i.e., wt (C) = w for all t > 0, then the wage payment at
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tenure 0 is w0 (C) = w + φ.
For a firm, the value of a match with productivity x when the contract governing its
relationship with the worker is C and the tenure of the worker under contract C is t is
denoted J tx (C), and is such that for all t ≥ 0,
rJ tx (C) = x− wt (C)− α
¡
1− γtx (C)
¢ ³
J tx (C)− J0x
³ eCx (x,C, t)´´ (7)
−
¡
αγtx (C) + δ
¢
J tx (C) +
¦
J tx (C) .
I will denote the value of a match with productivity x governed by a contract C and
tenure t by V tx (C) ≡W tx (C) + J tx (C). Hence, (6) and (7) yield that for all t ≥ 0,
rV tx (C) = x+ α
¡
1− γtx (C)
¢ ³
V 0x
³ eCx (x,C, t)´− V tx (C)´ (8)
+αγtx (C)
¡
W e (x,C, t)− V tx (C)
¢
− δ
¡
V tx (C)− U
¢
+
¦
V tx (C) .
Because contracts allow for tenure-varying wages, the value of a match to the firm and
the worker can change with tenure. Moreover, although the productivity of a match does
not change over time, the joint private value of a match can also vary with tenure because
the worker’s mobility decision can change with tenure. For instance, if a contract prescribes
that the value of the match to the worker increases with tenure, then the mobility decision,
as well as the value of changing employer, can also vary with tenure. Denote by W e the
maximum expected value of a job a new employer can oﬀer a worker. A worker will change
employer if and only if she obtains a higher value of a match with a new employer than what
her current employer oﬀers. If the contract linking the worker with her current employer
is such that the value of the match to the worker increases with tenure, there might be a
tenure T such that for all tenure t < T , the current employer cannot, or does not want
to, oﬀer a contract worth W e to its employee, i.e., the worker changes employer; but after
tenure T the worker’s value of the matches prescribed by the contract is strictly greater than
W e, in which case the worker stays in her job. Under this scenario the mobility decision
γtx (C) depends on tenure, implying the joint value of the match varies with tenure as well.
4.2 Equilibrium Mobility Decision
The productivity of a match is fixed once a worker matches with a firm. Hence, the only
possible sources of variation with tenure of the joint value of a match are the indicator
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function γtx (C), and the values W e (x,C, t) and V 0x ( eCx (x,C, t)). However, since the pro-
ductivity of a match is fixed, the joint private value of a match V 0x ( eCx (x,C, t)) can diﬀer
from V tx (C) if and only if either γ0x
³ eCx (x,C, t)´ or W e(C(x, eCx (x,C, t) , t)) diﬀer from
γtx (C) or W e(x,C, t). This implies that the joint private value of a match can vary with
tenure if and only if γtx (C) or W e(x,C, t) change with tenure. A priori, the maximum
expected joint private value of a match V x could be diﬀerent from V tx(C) for some t, al-
though we should have V 0x (C) = V x. In fact, given that there are maximum and minimum
initial values of a match that can be given to a firm and a worker forming a new match,
maximizing the value of a match at the onset could require that the split of the value of the
match between the firm and the worker changes with tenure. And this could then imply
that the value of the match increases or decreases compared to its initial maximum value.
We will now show that, in equilibrium, this will not be the case. To show this, let
us consider the mobility decision of a worker employed in a firm when the match has
productivity x, the contract in place is C, and the tenure on this contract is t. There is a
maximum expected value that a new potential employer is willing to accept to give to the
worker, W e, and this value is the maximum expected joint private value of the match V e.
All contracts that deliver this maximum expected joint private value must be such that,
for all possible productivity draws and for all tenures, the value of the match to the firm
is not negative, for otherwise it would be better oﬀ laying oﬀ the worker;13 And the value
of employment to the worker is no less than the value of unemployment, for otherwise the
worker would be better oﬀ quitting. This implies that V e =
R
z∈X V zdF (z). Naturally, the
maximum value that the worker’s current employer is willing to accept to give to the worker
is V x. In addition, the worker has a current contract C with her employer, and this contract
can prescribe an increase in value for the worker upon contact with another firm. However,
the maximum value prescribed must be less than V x if the contract is to be renegotiation
proof.
According to the rules of Game 2, the worker gets to propose a contract to the firms with
probability β and the firms propose contracts with probability 1−β. If the worker proposes
to the firms, she will ask for V e from the new firm and V x from her current employer. If
the firms propose, then the new firm proposes min{V e;V x}, whereas the current employer
13 If a menu of contract specifies that in some circumstances the value of the job to the firm is negative, the
worker knows the firm will not honor the contract, and therefore the menu of contracts is not renegotiation
proof.
16
proposes min{V e;V x}. The worker therefore expects to obtain
βV x + (1− β)min{V e;V x}
from her current employer in the second round, while she can guarantee
βV e + (1− β)min{V e;V x}
to herself from the new firm. Hence, if follows that in the first round, if V e ≥ V x, the
current employer oﬀers V x and the new firm oﬀers βV
e
+ (1− β)V x; Whereas if V
e < V x,
the current employer oﬀers βV x+(1− β)V
e
and the new firm oﬀers V e. In this latter case
it can be that the initial contract C linking the firm to its current employer prescribes that
the worker should receive more than βV x + (1 − β)V
e
, but in any case this must be less
than V x. Hence, the mobility decision of the worker in a match with productivity x under
contract C after tenure t is
γtx (C) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1, if V e ≥ V x, and
0, otherwise.
(9)
We first note that the mobility decision indicator function γtx (C) does not vary with
tenure, nor with the particular contract C governing the employment relationship between
a firm and a worker. Moreover, if the worker changes job when she is oﬀered a new job,
the expected value of the new match is βV e + (1− β)V x, which is also independent of the
actual contract, and tenure under this contract, linking the worker to her previous employer.
Hence, for any contract C belonging to the equilibrium set of contracts, the joint private
value of a match solves
rVx = x+ αγx (W
e (x)− Vx)− δ (Vx − U) ,
where W e (x) ≡ βV e + (1− β)Vx. All references to tenure or a specific contract have been
dropped, and it is recognized that all matches at all times have a joint private value equal
to the maximum joint private value that I simply denote by Vx when the productivity is x.
Hence,
rVx = x+ βαγx (V
e − Vx)− δ (Vx − U) , (10)
and, denoting by x∗ the equilibrium mobility cutoﬀ, i.e., the productivity value such that
Vx∗ = V e, the equilibrium mobility decision is given by
γx =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1, for x ≤ x∗, and
0, otherwise.
(11)
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Although the mobility decision indicator function and the expected value of a new job
are uniquely determined for a worker employed in a job with productivity x, the set of
equilibrium contracts yielding these is not a singleton. For instance, both tenure-dependent
and -independent contracts are possible in equilibrium. The only restrictions these contracts
must satisfy, in addition to their initial values being equal to Vx + β (V e − Vx), is that for
all possible productivity levels and any tenure t ≥ 0 the value of the match to the worker is
no less than the value of unemployment, for otherwise he would be better oﬀ quitting the
job; and the value of the match to the firm is non-negative, for otherwise the firm would lay
oﬀ the worker. Hence, any menu of contracts C(x) such that W e (x) = Vx + β (V e − Vx)
and W tz(Cz(x)) ∈ [U, Vz] for all z ∈ X and all tenure t ≥ 0 is an equilibrium contract. This
is reminiscent of Stevens (2004), who, in a set-up also based on Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) but where contracts are posted by firms rather than being bargained over, obtains
that there is more than one contract delivering the same allocation of workers and the same
initial value of a job to both firms and workers. One example of an admissible contract,
which is the type of contract that standard random search models focus on, is a flat-wage
contract, where for all z, all t,
W tz (Cz(x)) = Vx + β (Vz − Vx) .
Another type of contract, which is the type Stevens (2004) focuses on is a fee-contract. For
such contracts a worker joining a new firm pays a sign-on fee, which can be contingent on
his productivity, and the worker receives the entire product of the match thereafter.
We now turn our attention to the bargaining game played by an unemployed worker
and a firm, Game 1. In the second stage of the game, when the worker gets to propose a
contract she will propose a contract that gives her an expected value of V e. The firm, when
it gets to propose a contract, oﬀers a contract whose value to the worker equals the value of
unemployment U . Hence, the worker expects to obtain βV e + (1− β)U if the negotiations
reach the second round, and the firm consequently oﬀers her in the first round a menu of
contracts C(b) such that the expected value of matching is given by
W e (b) = U + β(V e − U). (12)
Naturally, C(b) must also be such that W tx(Cx(b)) ∈ [U, Vx] for all x ∈ X and all tenure
t ≥ 0 to be a renegotiation-proof contract. Once again, although the initial expected value
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of a match is unique for both the worker and the firm, the set of equilibrium contracts is
not a singleton.
Given (5) and (12), the value of unemployment can be rewritten as
rU = b+ βα (V e − U) . (13)
The joint private value of a match satisfies (10) with the mobility decision given by (11).
Therefore, it follows that
Vx =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x+δU+βαV e
r+δ+βα , for x ≤ x∗, and
x+δU
r+δ , otherwise.
The interpretation of the private joint value of the match Vx is similar to the one for
the social value, ωx, except that in the market economy, when a worker changes jobs she
captures a fraction β of the extra value generated from this job change. Solving for V e
yields
V e =
δU
r + δ
+∆(x∗;βα),
and hence we obtain that
Vx =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x+∆(x∗;βα)
r+δ+α +
δU
r+δ , if x < x
∗, and
x
r+δ +
δU
r+δ , otherwise.
Proposition 2 states that the equilibrium mobility cut-oﬀ x∗ exists and is unique, and
that as long as worker do not have all the bargaining power the equilibrium mobility cutoﬀ
is always lower than the eﬃcient one.
Proposition 2 (i) The equilibrium mobility cut-oﬀ x∗ is such that
x∗ = xe +
βα
r + δ
Z x
x∗
(x− x∗) dF (x), (14)
and it is unique.
(ii) For all β ∈ [0, 1], x∗ ≤ ex∗, with strict inequality for β < 1.
Proof. In the Appendix.
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5 Understanding the Ineﬃciency
The ineﬃciency of the equilibrium mobility decision of workers comes from the interaction
between (i) the incompleteness of contracts, and (ii) the asymmetry in the positions an
incumbent firm and a poaching firm are in because of the asymmetric information on the
quality of the two matches with the worker. When a firm negotiates with a worker, they
split the expected surplus of the match according to their respective bargaining powers, and
a firm can, if necessary, pledge to give the worker the entire (expected) surplus of the match
in order to keep (recruit) her. However, there is an asymmetry between a firm negotiating
with a current employee and a firm trying to poach the worker from another firm. If the
worker decides not to quit her current employer, it is because the contract with her current
employer is better than what she can obtain from a new job, and she will therefore never
quit her job. Hence, the joint private value of the match formed with her current employer
is such that
rVx = x− δ(Vx − U).
If the worker instead decides to change job, the expected joint value of the new match solves
rV e = xe +
Z
x∈X
[γx (W
e (x)− Vx)− δ(Vx − U)] dF (x).
The asymmetry arises from the fact that if the productivity draw is below the mobility
cut-oﬀ x∗, the worker will be looking to switch jobs again. And in this case, even if the firm
the worker just joined gave her the entire surplus of the match for each possible productivity
draw, when x < x∗ the worker’s value of her current match will be Vx < V e. Hence, when
she switches jobs again, the expected value she will be able to secure from the subsequent
match is W e (x) = Vx + β (V e − Vx), which is strictly less than V e for all x < x∗. That
is, she will capture only a fraction β of the additional surplus (V e − Vx) derived from the
creation of this subsequent match. This implies that when a worker changes jobs, although
the firm trying to poach her can pledge the entire expected surplus of this new match,
because the firm cannot include in her menu of contracts guarantees regarding the split of
the surplus with subsequent employers, should the draw of productivity be bad, this surplus
does not include the entire expected surplus of possible subsequent matches when x < x∗.
The incompleteness of contracts comes from the fact that a worker cannot contract with
potential future employers since she does not who that employer will be. If workers were able
to write down contracts with their future potential employers at the time of a job change,
20
they would be able to obtain the entire expected surplus of a match from these potential
future employers, and eﬃciency would be obtained. This type of contract incompleteness
is related to the contract incompleteness responsible for hold-up problems in models with
investment.
5.1 Eﬃciency Without Uncertainty
To illustrate the fact that the ineﬃciency requires both incompleteness of contracts and
uncertainty regarding new jobs’ productivity, let us consider the case where the productivity
a worker will have in a new job is known to her prior to deciding whether to accept a new
job. In this case, the value of unemployment U still solves (9): when a worker encounters a
firm and the productivity of the match if it is formed is known to be x, the firm will propose
βVx + (1 − β)U to the worker in the first round of Game 1, and the worker accepts. The
value of being employed in a job with productivity x under contract C with tenure t follows
rW tx (C) = w
t(C) +
¦
W tx (C) + α
Z
z∈X
γx,z
¡
W 0z (Cz(x))−W tx (C)
¢
dF (z)
+α
Z
z∈X
¡
1− γx,z
¢ ³
W 0x
³ eCx (z, C)´−W tx (C)´ dF (z)− δ ¡W tx (C)− U¢ .
Following the line of argument used earlier, we know that when the worker is in contact
with another firm, the decision of whether to change jobs, summarized in γx,z, depends on
the productivity of her current job x and of the new match oﬀered to her, z; And it does
not depend on her tenure nor on the specific contract C she was working under. When the
worker does not change jobs, the value of staying with the current employer can increase,
i.e., W 0x ( eCx (z, C)) > W tx (C), but that depends on the contract that is currently linking
her to her employer and the productivity of the new job she was proposed. Here the value
of the match to the worker can still change with tenure because the wage is allowed to be
tenure-dependent. We can easily derive a similar equation for the value of a match to the
firm and obtain that the joint private value of a match with productivity x follows
rVx = x+ α
Z
z∈X
γx,z
¡
W 0z (Cz(x))− Vx
¢
dF (z)− δ (Vx − U) .
It is quite straightforward to establish that following the protocol of Game 2, a worker
will change job if and only if z ≥ x, which corresponds to the eﬃcient mobility decision.
And in this case the worker’s new value of a match is W 0z (Cz(x)) = Vx + β(Vz − Vx).
Hence, despite the fact that a worker does obtain only a fraction β of the additional surplus
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created by her job change, the mobility decision is eﬃcient. Eﬃciency is obtained in this
case because two firms competing for a worker are in a symmetric situation. In fact, the
surplus of either match depends on the value of future matches in higher productivity jobs,
and in either case the worker will obtain a fraction β of the additional surplus created by
her job changes.
6 Eﬃciency With Complete Enforceability of Contracts
Despite the incompleteness of contracts, it is possible to obtain eﬃciency of the mobility
decision without altering the random search assumption.14 Eﬃciency requires extending
the ability of firms to commit to honoring a contract to situations where they would have
liked to severe the match because its value to them is negative. More precisely, if contracts
are fully binding, firms and workers will be able to negotiate contracts that render the
equilibrium mobility decision eﬃcient because contracts guarantee that a worker will secure
the entire surplus of future matches should she decide to change jobs.
6.1 Eﬃcient Contracts
Consider a worker currently unemployed and who is bargaining with a firm. Consider the
menu of contract C(b) such that W tx(Cx(b)) = V e for all possible productivity levels x
below the mobility cut-oﬀ for all tenure t > 0, and such that W e(b) = U +β (V e − U). The
expected value of the menu of contracts to the firm is (1− β)V e. This menu of contracts,
to be implemented, requires that a firm be able to commit to a contract, no matter whether
it regrets it ex post. In fact, C(b) prescribes that the worker gets V e for all values of
productivities x ≤ x∗ after the match is created, and we have that the value of the match
to the firm is J tx(Cx(b)) = Vx −W tx (Cx(b)) = Vx − V e ≤ 0, for all tenure t > 0, with strict
inequality for x < x∗. In this latter case, the firm would like to be able to renege on its
contract and lay oﬀ the worker.
C(b) is such that the mobility decision of the worker is privately eﬃcient since the
worker will quit the job when contacted by another firm if and only if the productivity
draw is x ≤ x∗. In fact, the firm and the worker can renegotiate the contract later on if the
14Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that firms’ investment decisions is eﬃcient in search models only if
workers can direct their search.
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worker is contacted by another firm. Since W tx(Cx(b)) = V e and J tx(Cx(b)) = Vx − V e ≤ 0
for all tenure t > 0 when x ≤ x∗, the current employer in this case does not wish to retain
the worker if she is contacted by another firm, whereas a newly contacted firm can oﬀer
V e as expected value of a new match to the worker. However, if x > x∗, even if the value
of employment to the worker with her current employer at the time she is contacted by
another firm is below V e, her current employer will oﬀer the worker at stage 1 of Game 2
a contract that prevents her from quitting: it will oﬀer βVx + (1− β)V e.
Moreover, C(b) maximizes the joint private value of the match by putting the worker in
the position of extracting all the additional surplus she will create by changing jobs if the
productivity draw in the new job were to be below x∗. With this contract, the joint private
value of the match for a productivity draw x is such that
rVx = x+ αγx(V
e − Vx)− δ(Vx − U), (15)
with
γx =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1, if x ≤ x∗, and
0, otherwise.
(16)
Menus of contracts C(b) such that W tx(Cx(b)) = V e for all x ≤ x∗, for all tenure t > 0,
and such that W e(b) = U + β (V e − U) maximize the expected joint private value of a
match, and therefore all equilibrium menus of contracts negotiated between a firm and an
unemployed worker following the protocol of Game 1 must have these same properties.
We have established above that with complete contract enforceability the value of em-
ployment for workers who negotiated their contracts while unemployed must be such that
for all x ≤ x∗ they receive W tx (Cx) = V e for all t > 0. Hence, these workers will capture
the entire additional surplus created by their job mobility when the productivity of their
current jobs is lower than the mobility productivity cut-oﬀ. Naturally, to be able to poach
away a worker, a firm must oﬀer at the first stage of Game 2 a contract that maximizes
the joint private value of the match. This implies that the contract oﬀered to a worker
currently employed in a job with productivity x must also be such that for all productivity
draws z ≤ x∗, the worker’s value of employment is W tz (Cz(x)) = V e for all t > 0 and
W e(x) = V e for all x. Hence, the joint private value of a match created by a firm and
a previously employed worker when the productivity draw is x also follows (15), with the
mobility decision given by (16).
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In summary, when a firm meets a currently employed worker whose job’s productivity
is x, if x > x∗ the current employer oﬀers the worker a contract worth Vx + β (V e − Vx) in
the first stage of game 2 whereas the poaching firm oﬀers V e, and the worker stays with her
current employer. If x ≤ x∗, the current employer will oﬀer the worker Vx in the first stage
of Game 2 and the poaching firm will oﬀer V e, and since the worker is indiﬀerent between
her current contract and the contract oﬀered by the poaching firm, she joins the new firm.
Hence, we have that when firms can fully commit to a contract, the joint private value
of a match with productivity x is given by
Vx =
⎧
⎨
⎩
x+δU+αV e
r+δ+α , for x ≤ x∗, and
x+δU
r+δ , for x > x
∗.
This implies that the expected joint private value of a match is
V e =
δ
r + δ
U +∆(x∗;α),
and therefore the equilibrium mobility cut-oﬀ in this case is such that
x∗ = xe +
α
r + δ
Z x
x∗
(x− x∗)dF (x). (17)
Equation (17) is identical to (4) which characterizes the eﬃcient mobility productivity
cut-oﬀ, and since this equation has a unique solution, we obtain that x∗ = ex∗. This is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When contracts are fully enforceable, the equilibrium mobility cut-oﬀ x∗ is
equal to the eﬃcient mobility cut-oﬀ ex∗ for all values of β.
There are several ways to design menus of contracts for unemployed and employed
workers that will deliver an eﬃcient mobility decision. Once such way is to give to the
worker the value W tx (Cx(b)) = V e for all tenure t ≥ 0 and all x ≤ ex∗. However, in order to
obtain
R
x∈X W
0
x (Cx(b)) dF (x) = U + β (V e − U) for unemployed workers, this implies thatZ x
x∗
W 0x (Cx(b)) dF (x) = (β − F (x∗))V e + (1− β)U , (18)
which gives that the expected initial value of employment, conditional on drawing x ≤ x∗
is
(β − F (x∗))V e + (1− β)U
F (x∗)
.
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This expected initial value of employment might thus be less than the value of unemploy-
ment U . Such menus of contracts might therefore require that in some realization of the
productivity draw the worker continue working for the firm, although he would prefer to be
unemployed. However, it might not be desirable for a firm to employ a worker under such
condition. For instance, if we were to introduce eﬀort in this paper, in this case the worker
is not likely to exert eﬀort.
There is another way to design menus of contracts that deliver eﬃciency and at the
same time do not require workers to work when they would like to quit. These menus of
contracts have a fee-paying structure à la Stevens (2004), where the worker pays a fee ϕ
upon acceptance of the job. The payment of an up-front fee by the worker enables the firm
to secure a fraction 1 − β of the expected surplus when the worker is unemployed, and at
the same time guarantee the workers a value of the match of V e if the productivity draw is
x ≤ ex∗, and a value at least equal to the value of unemployment if x > ex∗.
Let us consider the case where oﬀering an unemployed worker the valueW tx (Cx(b)) = V e
for all tenure t ≥ 0 and all x ≤ ex∗ implies that the value of employment for x > x∗ has
to be negative for a positive measure of the productivity draw. And let us consider the
case where firms charge an up-front fee which is not contingent on the productivity draw.
From equation (18), we have that the minimum non-contingent fee that delivers that, for
all x > ex∗, the value of employment is such that W tx (Cx(b)) = U for all tenure t ≥ 0, is
such that
ϕ = U − [(β − F (x∗))V e + (1− β)U ] ,
which simplifies to
ϕ = (F (x∗)− β) (V e − U).
6.2 The Limits to Eﬃciency
As noted by Stevens (2004), fee-contracts require workers to pay an up-front fee, which
might not be feasible for a host of reasons, like the existence of credit or legal constraints.
Stevens thus studies the structure of optimal contracts when fees are not allowed and there
is a minimum wage. She shows that the constrained-optimal contract in this case is such
that the worker receives the minimum wage up to some tenure T , after which she receives
the entire product of the match. In the environment with bargaining of this paper Stevens’
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analysis can be followed to show that the tenure T during which a worker receives the
minimum wage depends on the initial value of the match given to the worker.
If a worker is initially unemployed, the contract proposed by a firm must be such that
W e(b) = U + β (V e − U) and W tx (Cx(b)) ≥ U for all x, all t ≥ 0. However, suppose a
contract such that W tx (Cx(b)) = V e for all x ≤ x∗, all t ≥ 0, implies that W tx (Cx(b)) < U
for some positive measure of productivities x > x∗, some interval for tenure [0,et) ≥ 0. Then,
to obtainW tx (Cx(b)) ≥ U for all x, all t ≥ 0, a contract must prescribe that for some positive
measure of productivities x ≤ x∗, W tx (Cx(b)) < V e for some interval for tenure [0,bt). The
optimal contract is then such that for all x and z ≤ x∗, W tx (Cx(b)) = W tz (Cz(b)) < V e for
the interval for tenure [0, T (b)), the value of employment increases continuously until tenure
T (b), and W tx (Cx(b)) = V e for all t ≥ T (b), all x ≤ x∗.
If a worker employed in a job with productivity x ≤ x∗ becomes in contact with another
firm before the tenure after which she will receive V e, then the tenure for the match during
which she will receive a value of employment less than V e will vary with the value of
employment at the time she was hired. This is because, if, for instance, we consider workers
employed in their first job since their last unemployment spell, the value of employment for
all x ≤ x∗ will be strictly less than V e for all t < T (b) and γtx(C) = 1 for all t, with
rW tx (C) = wmin + α
¡
W e (x,C, t)−W tx (C)
¢
− δ
¡
W tx (C)− U
¢
+
¦
W tx (C) ,
where wmin is the minimum wage a firm is allowed to pay a worker, and
W e (x,C, t) = max{W tx (C) , V tx (C)}+ βV e < V e.
This is because if W tx (C) ≥ V tx (C) the worker’s bargaining position in Game 2 is deter-
mined by the value of her current match under her current contract, W tx (C). If, on the
contrary, V tx (C) > W tx (C), then match has a positive value for the current employer. In
this case the current employer will be oﬀering an improved contract to the worker in Game
2. Since W tx (C) and, as will be shown shortly, V tx (C) increase with the tenure of the
worker on the job, we have that W e (x,C, t) increases with t. It follows that when the
worker changes jobs, the tenure during which she receives less than V e depends negatively
on max{W tx (C) , V tx (C)}, and therefore depends negatively on the tenure on her previous
job.
Importantly, it follows that if it is not possible, or desirable, for firms to employ workers
when their value of employment is less than the value of unemployment, and if fee-contracts
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are not feasible, the mobility decisions of workers will not be eﬃcient. In fact, the joint
private value of a match with productivity x ≤ x∗ when the tenure of a match is t < T (b)
for a worker hired when unemployed depends on the tenure, and is such that
rV tx (C) = x+ α
¡
W e (x,C, t)− V tx (C)
¢
− δ
¡
V tx (C)− U
¢
+
¦
V tx (C) .
A similar argument applies for workers who have recently changed jobs, and whose value
of employment W tx (C) is still strictly less than V e. Hence, workers employed in jobs with
productivity x ≤ x∗ with tenure less than the tenure beyond which they will receive V e
from their employers will not be able to capture the entire surplus of a future match if they
meet another firm. It should be noted, however, that the degree of ineﬃciency is lesser than
when firms can walk away from a contract freely.
7 Conclusion
This paper has identified a new ineﬃciency in search models when jobs are experience goods
and employment contracts are the outcomes of bargaining games. In the absence of full
enforceability of contracts, firms cannot credibly oﬀer to currently employed workers looking
for another job contracts that will guarantee them the entire surplus of all future matches
should the new match be of low productivity. Furthermore, even if firms can fully commit
to contracts they have agreed to, if eﬃcient contracts prescribe that workers work even if
the value of employment to them for some draws of the productivity falls below the value
of unemployment, and that either such contracts are illegal or cannot be enforced, then
eﬃciency would fail to be obtained.
Given that workers can always choose not to exert eﬀort and that eﬀort is diﬃcult to
verify by a third party, including a court of justice, it is diﬃcult to imagine that such
contracts are indeed enforceable to workers. Moreover, even if it is more easily conceivable
that workers can obtain from a court of justice that a firm honor a contract, there are issues
with the determination of the dismissal costs to be paid to the worker in case of a breach of a
contract. For instance, it might not be possible to guarantee that severance payments paid
by a firm to a worker it dismissed reflect entirely the loss of wealth suﬀered by the worker.
In such cases, firms might prefer to dismiss a worker because the loss due to the severance
payment is less than the value of the loss the firm makes by keeping the worker. Moreover,
firms might ostracize workers whose value of the match to them is negative in order to
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get the workers to resign rather than dismiss them. Hence, it would appear that complete
enforceability of contracts might fail, and therefore worker turnover would be ineﬃcient.
Hence, the title of the paper.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Since ex∗ is such that ωhx∗ = ωe we haveex∗
r + δ
+
δωu
r + δ
=
δωu
r + δ
+∆(ex∗;α),
or ex∗ = r + δ
r + δ + α (1− F (ex∗))
∙
xe +
α
r + δ
Z x
hx∗
xdF (x)
¸
,
which can be rewritten as
ex∗ = xe + α
r + δ
Z x
hx∗
(x− ex∗) dF (x).
Defining Φ (z) = z − xe − α/(r + δ)
R x
z (x− z) dF (x), we have that Φ (x) = x − xe −
α/(r+δ)
R
x∈X (x− z) dF (x) < 0 and Φ (x) = x−xe > 0 and therefore since Φ is continuous
on X we have proven existence by the Implicit Function Theorem. The fact that
∂Φ (z)
∂z
= 1 +
α(1− F (z))
r + δ
> 0
yields uniqueness. QED
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) Since x∗ is such that Vx∗ = V e we have
x∗
r + δ
+
δU
r + δ
=
δU
r + δ
+∆(x∗;βα),
or
x∗ =
r + δ
r + δ + βα (1− F (x∗))
∙
xe +
βα
r + δ
Z x
x∗
xdF (x)
¸
,
which can be rewritten as
x∗ = xe +
βα
r + δ
Z x
x∗
(x− x∗) dF (x).
Defining eΦ (z) = z − xe − βα/(r + δ) R xz (x− z) dF (x), we have that eΦ (x) = x − xe −
βα/(r+ δ)
R x
z (x− z) dF (x) < 0 and eΦ (x) = x−xe > 0 and therefore since eΦ is continuous
on X we have proven existence by the Implicit Function Theorem. The fact that
∂eΦ (z)
∂z
= 1 +
βα(1− F (z))
r + δ
> 0
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yields uniqueness. QED
(ii) The result follows from the fact eΦ (x) < Φ (x) and ∂eΦ (z) /∂z < ∂Φ (z) /∂z. QED
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